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Abstract
Allotment and subcontracting are the two alternative mechanisms enabling the par-
ticipation of SMEs in procurement. We compare these two alternatives in the context of
a procurement contract awarded by a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction. When the winning
large ﬁrm is constrained with respect to the degree of subcontracting, we show that only
a reduction of the chosen SME’s proﬁt can reduce the expected cost of the contract. How-
ever, when the large ﬁrm is allowed to choose the subcontracting level, subcontracting
can be a Pareto dominating mechanism, i.e. simultaneously increasing both ﬁrms’ proﬁts
and reducing the expected total cost of the contract.
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11 Introduction
The World Bank estimates that current spending and growth investment activity by govern-
ments account for 18% of GDP in developed countries, 13% of GDP in developing nations
and 19% of GDP in transitional economies.1 In most countries, microenterprises and small-
scale enterprises account for the majority of ﬁrms and a large share of employment and it
may be the policy of governments to provide maximum practicable opportunities in their
acquisitions from small business. For example, SMEs account for over 65 % of turnover gen-
erated by the private sector in the European Union, but the share of public contracts won
directly (not taking subcontracting into account) by SMEs remains low (less than 25 %).
For some years already the European Commission has paid special attention to the access
and participation of SMEs in the public procurement market. The Commission has called
for greater participation by SMEs with a view to strengthening their competitiveness and
enabling them to contribute more towards growth, employment and competitiveness in the
European economy. Similar concerns can be found in the US Federal Acquisition Regula-
tion (FAR). Indeed, section 19.202-1 of the FAR is devoted to “encouraging small business
participation in acquisitions”
“Small business concerns shall be aﬀorded an equitable opportunity to com-
pete for all contracts that they can perform to the extent consistent with the
Government’s interest. When applicable, the contracting oﬃcer shall take the
following actions:
(a) Divide proposed acquisitions of supplies and services (except construction)
into reasonably small lots (not less than economic production runs) to permit
oﬀers on quantities less than the total requirement. [...]
(d) Encourage prime contractors to subcontract with small business concerns”.
1Source: Oxford Analytica Academic Database.
2As noted in a report to the US Small Business Administration,2 despite clauses in the
FAR calling on contract oﬃcers to make special eﬀorts to sustain small business participation
in procurement, budget cuts and directives to streamline the procurement process may be
leading contracting oﬃcers to consolidate small purchases into larger contracts in the name
of a limited eﬃciency. These kinds of procurement “eﬃciencies” impact small businesses
negatively because the requirements of larger, multi-faceted contracts can easily outstrip the
ﬁnancial or administrative capabilities of a small business, precluding them from competing.
Furthermore, the opportunity for small businesses to subcontract from the larger companies
winning the bundled contracts may also diminish because of a tendency for larger ﬁrms to use
their own resources on the contracts they win. Evidence of the negative impact of contract
bundling on small business was ﬁrst presented in the U.S. Small Business Administration’s
1993 report.3
Similarly, the sixth European Observatory for SMEs shows that the most important reason
why SMEs do not try to participate in European tenders is that the projects are too large for
their enterprises. It also reveals that there are considerable country diﬀerences with regard to
the participation of SMEs in the public procurement market. In Sweden, Italy and Portugal
the percentage of SMEs trying to participate in European tenders is lower than 10%, whereas
in France it is 45%. In Belgium and Luxembourg about one third of the SMEs attempt to
participate.
The primary way of enabling SMEs’ participation in public procurement is to divide
proposed acquisitions of supplies and services into reasonably small lots to permit oﬀers
on quantities less than the total requirement. This allotment enables wide small business
participation. Further, some countries have established programmes to encourage the use of
SMEs in subcontracting with large businesses. In such programmes, the government awards
2“The Impact of Contract Bundling on Small Business”, report by Eagle Eye Publishers, Inc. to the US
Small Business Administration’s Oﬃce of Advocacy, (2000).
3U.S. Small Business Administration, Study of the Impact of Contract Bundling on Small Business Concerns
and Practical Recommendations (Report to the Committee on Small Business of the United States Senate
and the Committee on Small Business of the United States House of Representatives, 14 May 1993), 77 pages.
3a contract to a large ﬁrm with the requirement or goal that the large ﬁrm purchase x% of
the value of its intermediate inputs from SMEs. Subcontracting programmes can thus be
viewed as an alternative means of involving SMEs in public procurement activities. Hence,
subcontracting and allotment of a procurement contract are the two alternative ways for
SMEs to access public procurement.
Should the public buyer promote the participation of SMEs by an allotment of procure-
ment contracts or encourage subcontracting practices when contracts are awarded by means
of a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction ? This is the main concern of this paper.
To the best of our knowledge, this question has never been addressed in the literature
though subcontracting and allotment have already been considered separately.
The literature on subcontracting essentially focuses on the agency relation between a
ﬁrm and its subcontractors (e.g. Yun (1999) or Kawasaki and McMillan (1987)) and on
the impact of the possibility of subsequent subcontracting among rivals on the competition
between two ﬁrms (e.g. Kamien et al. (1989) or Gale et al. (2000)). We depart from these
analyses, assuming that large ﬁrms do not subcontract among rivals but more realistically
with SMEs.4 Besides, no positive studies of the allotment procedure have been done5.
In this article, we consider the procurement of a ﬁxed-price contract awarded by means
of a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction. The aim of this paper is to compare the allotment and
subcontracting procedures in order to exhibit some implications of these procedures for the
minimization of the total cost of the contract and also for small business and large ﬁrms’
proﬁts. More precisely, we derive conditions under which both the winning large ﬁrm and
the winning or chosen SME can be better oﬀ with the allotment procedure or with the
subcontracting procedure. We also show, counter-intuitively, that the public buyer and the
large ﬁrms can beneﬁt from the asymmetric information between SMEs and large ﬁrms.
Furthermore, when the winning large ﬁrm is constrained on the subcontracting level, we show
that only a reduction of the chosen SME’s proﬁt can reduce the expected cost of the contract.
4Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) have addressed the question of the value of delegating subcontracting to a
regulated ﬁrm in a normative approach.
5For a normative approach of optimal allotment rules, see Morand (2003).
4However, when the large ﬁrm is allowed to choose the subcontracting level, subcontracting
can be a Pareto dominating mechanism, i.e. simultaneously increasing both ﬁrms’ proﬁta n d
reducing the expected total cost of the contract. It gives strong support that the public buyer
should not constrain the level of subcontracting and that contrarily to common view SMEs
are not necessarily better oﬀ when a part of a contract has been speciﬁcally allotted to them.
The next section presents the model and its assumptions. Section 3 characterizes the
allotment procedure whereas the subcontracting procedure is discussed in section 4. Section
5o ﬀers a ﬁrst comparison of both procedures when the subcontracting level is imposed.
Section 6 deals with the same comparison in a more general context, i.e. when large ﬁrms
are allowed to choose the subcontracting level. A ﬁnal section contains concluding remarks.
Most of the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Outline of the model
We consider a procurement contract awarded by a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction. We assume
that the supply-side of the market is composed of n large ﬁrms (hereafter LFs) and m small
business ﬁrms (hereafter SBFs). All ﬁrms are assumed to be risk-neutral.
Let p ∈ [0,1] be the proportion of the contract undertaken by a small business ﬁrm
(hereafter SBF), either by a subcontracting or an allotment procedure.
Each large ﬁrm (hereafter LF) i =1 ,...,n and each SBF j =1 ,...,m has private infor-
mation about its own eﬃciency parameter θi and θj entering into its respective cost function
ci(θi,p) ∀i =1 ,...,n and cj(θj,p) ∀j =1 ,...,m. However, it is common knowledge that θi
and θj are i.i.d. on the interval [θ−,θ +], according to probability density f, with cumulative
F.6
Concerning cost functions, we naturally have
∂ci(θi,p)
∂p < 0 and
∂cj(θj,p)







∂p2 > 0 and
∂cj(θj,p)
∂θj > 0. We also assume that
∂2ci(θi,p)
∂p∂θi < 0, which means that the larger the part of the contract undertaken by the LF, the
6θ
− is assumed to reﬂect the parameter of the most eﬃcient ﬁrm.




3 The allotment procedure
In this section, we consider that by law, the contract has to be sub-divided into two lots, so
that SBFs can have direct access to one of the lots. Then, n LFs compete for the award of
ap a r t(1 − pa) of the contract and m SBFs compete for the award of the reminder pa.W i t h
this allotment (a) procedure, we assume that subcontracting is not allowed.
The expected proﬁto fL Fi in a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction is
Eπa
i =( bi − ci(θi,p a))(1 − F(b
−1
(bi)))n−1. (1)
Then, each LF i chooses a bid bi to maximize Eπa
i. The derivative of the expected proﬁt
















∂θ (1 − F(θ))n−1dθ
(1 − F(θi))n−1 ∀i =1 ,...,n.
The optimal bidding strategy is equal to the true cost plus a strategic mark-up. Contrary to
conventional developments in auction theory, the strategic mark-up is not directly related to
the eﬃciency parameter but to the cost function and so is aﬀected by the marginal variation of
this cost induced by the variation of the eﬃciency parameter. This is the marginal competition
eﬀect, which turns out to be crucial in the following.8 Note that by assumption,
∂ci(θ,pa)
∂θi > 0
∀i. Actually, the more the cost is sensitive to the eﬃciency parameter, the greater is the
diﬀerence between the winner and the second bidder and so the more the winner can increase
its strategic mark-up.
7See the appendix.
8This eﬀect was ﬁrst depicted by Marechal and Morand (2003), but in a less general framework.






∂θ (1 − F(θ))m−1dθ
(1 − F(θj))m−1 ∀j =1 ,...,m.
Let us denote g(θi)=n(1 − F(θi))n−1f (θi)dθi as the density function of the lowest cost of
the n LFs, and h(θj)=m(1−F(θj))m−1f (θj)dθj as the density function of the lowest cost
of the m SBFs.
Given ba
i(θi) and ba







































Remark 1 For both the winning LF and the winning SBF, the expected proﬁto n l yd e p e n d s
on the marginal competition eﬀect. Indeed, in an auction, the proﬁt derived by the winner is
equal to the expected strategic mark-up.
4 The subcontracting procedure
In this section, we consider that the contract is not sub-divided so that SBFs only have access
to public procurement by means of subcontracting.
We consider that the proportion of the contract to be subcontracted is not constrained by
regulation.9 So, only LFs compete for the award of the whole contract but may subcontract
a part of this contract. According to e.g. the US subcontracting regulation for contracts
that is expected to exceed $500,000 (1,000,000 for construction),10 we assume that each LF is
9We further relax this assumption, considering that the subcontracting level is imposed by procurement
rules. This will enable us to highlight some speciﬁcr e s u l t s .
10Exceptions to this rule can be found in Section 19.702 of the US Federal Acquisition Regulation.
7required to submit the potential subcontracting plan before the award of the contract. Then,
each LF i has to choose both the subcontracting level p(θi) and a bid bi.
The bargaining process between the winning LF and the chosen SBF is modelled in a
very simple way. The payment received by the SBF depends on the bargaining power of both
ﬁrms. Furthermore, although the information is asymmetric, we assume that the bargaining
process results in the most eﬃcient SBF being chosen.
Therefore, we can consider that the LF pays the SBF at a cost cj(b θ,p(θi)),w h e r eb θ>
θ
(1)
j the expected true eﬃciency parameter of the chosen (and most eﬃcient) SBF. Roughly
speaking, the closer b θ is to θ
(1)
j , the greater is the bargaining power of the LF. However, under
asymmetric information, no bargaining process can perform better than an optimal auction.
Hence, cj(b θ,p(θi)) is bounded below by cj(θ
(2)
j ,p(θi)), the second lowest cost of the m SBFs,
which would correspond to the result of an auction mechanism.
Note that we will also consider a context of complete information between LFs and SBFs
as a benchmark situation. This case corresponds to a context in which LFs know, contrary
to the public buyer, the true costs of the SBFs. The winning LF can then choose the most
eﬃcient SBF, characterized by θ
(1)
j , and this latter receives no rents.
When a LF is selected, it has to support a total cost which is equal to the sum of its
own cost (the non-subcontracted part of the contract) plus the negotiated cost of the chosen
subcontractor (as long as a part of the contract is subcontracted).
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can either be positive, negative or equal to zero, since a more eﬃcient







vanishes since p(θi) maximizes Eπs
i(θi).
Following the derivations of the previous section, we obtain the optimal bidding strategy11
of LF i
bs











(1 − F(θi))n−1 ∀i =1 ,...,n.
Note that, compared to the previous bidding strategy ba
i(θi), the marginal competition eﬀect
still appears but in the context of a new speciﬁce ﬀect. Indeed,
∂cj(  θ,p(θi))
∂θi reﬂects the impact
of the LF’s eﬃciency on the bargaining result.
• If
∂cj(  θ,p(θi))




∂θi > 0, am o r ei n e ﬃcient LF is then a poorer bargainer (production special-
ized).
• F i n a l l y ,t h ec a s ew h e r e
∂cj(  θ,p(θi))
∂θi =0reﬂects the assumption that the LF’s eﬃciency
does not aﬀect the bargaining result.
11In order to satisfy
dbs
i(θi)




∂θi > 0 ∀θi.















































Before turning to consider the main concern of our paper, an interesting question to investi-
gate is whether the public buyer and/or the LFs and the SBFs are better oﬀ under asymmetric
information. Note that the chosen SBF gets no rents when, contrary to the public buyer, the
LF knows the SBFs’ costs. Then obviously, from (9), SBFs are better oﬀ under asymmet-
ric information, since Eπ
s(1)
j > 0 when b θ>θ
(1)
j . Somewhat counter-intuitively we have the
following lemma
Lemma 1 The winning LF can be better oﬀ when information is asymmetric (i.e. when
SBFs have private information about their cost) if it is production specialized. In this case,
both the chosen SBF and the winning LF can be better oﬀ when information is asymmetric
between them.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This lemma can be easily interpreted. Since each LF incorporates the negotiated cost of
the subcontractor into its bidding strategy, the global negotiated cost is neutral for the LF;
only the marginal competition eﬀect of eﬃciency on negotiated cost matters. Under complete
information between LFs and SBFs, this latter vanishes. So the winning LF can be better
oﬀ if asymmetric information unables it to increase its mark-up.
Furthermore, the goal of minimizing total costs can be better achieved under incomplete
information, according to the following
10Lemma 2 The expected cost of the contract may be lower under incomplete information than
under complete information if the winning LF is highly bargaining specialized.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Indeed, when the LF is bargaining specialized, it gets more rents under incomplete infor-
mation than under complete information, which increases expected total costs.
Let us now compare in the following the two procurement procedures.
5A ﬁrst comparison
In order to generate some interesting ﬁrst results, we now consider that the subcontracting
level is imposed by the public buyer. Roughly speaking, this ﬁrst comparison will highlight
the problem of delegation. Indeed, the public buyer has to choose between two procedures:
either the winning LF is delegated to subcontract a given part of the project or the contract
is divided so that SBFs can directly compete for the award of t h es a m eg i v e np a r tof the
contract. Note that this ﬁrst comparison does not incorporate the indirect impact of the
modiﬁcation of the subcontracting level which is analyzed in the next section.
When subcontracting is imposed, the analysis can be derived in a straightforward fashion
from the previous section, substituting p(θi)=pa.













(1 − F(θi))n−1 , ∀i =1 ,...,n




∂θi > 0 to ensure that bs
i(θi) is increasing.
5.1 Comparison of proﬁts with imposed subcontracting
From (8) and (4), when p(θi)=pa, the diﬀerence in the winning LF’s expected proﬁts derived















11Lemma 3 If the bargaining power of the LF does not depend on its own eﬃciency, then
allotting a part of the contract or imposing upon the LF to subcontract the same part yields
the same proﬁt for the winning LF.
Proof.I f
∂cj(  θ,pa)







∂θi < 0, i.e. a more ineﬃcient LF is a better bargainer (bargaining
specialized), then the winning LF gets a higher proﬁtw i t ha l l o t m e n t .I f
∂cj(  θ,pa)
∂θi > 0, i.e. a
more ineﬃcient LF is a poorer bargainer (production specialized), then the winning LF gets
ah i g h e rp r o ﬁt with subcontracting.
From the point of view of the winning LF, only the marginal competition eﬀect matters.
Even if a LF is a poorer bargainer, the global competition eﬀect does not matter since its
bid covers the cost of the SBF. The key element is the gap between the LF’s cost and the
second expected net cost, i.e. its cost plus the cost paid to the subcontractor. In a nutshell
the second bidder is less eﬃcient than the ﬁrst one and therefore if a less eﬃcient ﬁrm is
a better bargainer the gap between both net costs is reduced. This leads to a reduction in
markup for the winner. Conversely, the same argument applies when a less eﬃcient ﬁrm is a
poorer bargainer.


















Equation (11) shows that a SBF prefers to be a subcontractor than to participate in the
auction if the gain from the bargaining process is higher than the expected strategic mark-up
obtained in the auction.
Recall that standard developments in auction theory show that the winner’s expected
proﬁt, in a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction, corresponds to the diﬀerence between its own cost





j = cj(b θ,pa) − cj(θ
(1)













j ,p a) reﬂects the expected second lowest cost among m SBFs.
Under our framework (with symmetric, risk-neutral bidders and independent private val-
ues), it is well known that the optimal bargaining institution is an auction, and that a
ﬁrst-price auction is revenue-equivalent to other auction mechanisms. Hence, in a context of
asymmetric information, we have cj(b θ,pa) ≥ cj(θ
(2)
j ,p a), since an auction is the most power-
ful tool to extract rents. Consequently, a SBF always prefers to be a subcontractor than to
participate in an auction (obviously, SBFs are better oﬀ with the allotment procedure if LFs
know the SBFs’ costs).
5.2 Comparison of total costs with imposed subcontracting
From (3) and (7), the comparison between expected total costs, when the public buyer uses


























Since the subcontracted part of the contract corresponds to the allotted part, the cost of the
winning LF is the same under both procedures. Nevertheless, the cost of the winning SBF
diﬀers, because it either represents the cost the LF negotiates and incorporates into its own
bid, or the expected second cost among the m SBFs when the contract is allotted. Therefore,
only rents conceded to the winning LF and the chosen SBF modify the expected total cost
of the contract. We then have the following lemma
12See e.g. Krishna (2002) and Klemperer (1999) for surveys of auction theory.
13Lemma 4 If there is asymmetric information between LFs and SBFs (about SBFs’ costs)
and if LFs’ eﬃciency does not modify their bargaining power, then allotting a part of the
contract reduces the total expected cost compared to imposing upon the LF the requirement to
s u b c o n t r a c tt h es a m ep a r t . 13
Proof. See the Appendix.
Since p(θi)=pa, the expected total cost is only aﬀected by rents conceded to both LFs
and SBFs. When the bargaining power of the LF does not depend on its own eﬃciency, from
lemma 3, the proﬁt of the winning LF is the same. So the expected total cost diﬀers only by
the SBF’s rents and under asymmetric information, the allotment procedure performs better
in reducing expected total costs. Obvioulsy, under complete information between LFs and
SBFs, the SBF’s rents vanish. So, the cost minimizing goal is better achieved when the public
buyer delegates the selection of the SBF.
The comparison between expected proﬁts of the chosen SBF and expected costs of the
contract highlights the trade-oﬀ between cost eﬃciency concerns and a public policy which
favors SBFs. Indeed, we have the following proposition
Proposition 1 When the LF is constrained on the subcontracting level, only a reduction of
the chosen SBF’s proﬁt can reduce the expected cost of the contract. Hence, there does not
exist any Pareto dominating mechanism.
Proof. See the Appendix.
6 Subcontracting vs allotment
The previous results clearly rely on the assumption that the subcontracting level is imposed
by law, and corresponds to the allotted part. In order to highlight the impact of the choice of
13Assuming complete information between LFs and SBFs on SBFs’ costs may also require the assumption
of complete information among SBFs. In this case, the result of the bidding process among the SBFs would
actually remain unchanged in terms of expected cost which will in each case correspond to the second lowest
cost.
14the subcontracting level by the LF, we now return to the general case where the law enables
LFs to choose the subcontracting level p(θ).
6.1 Comparison of proﬁts
Let us ﬁrst analyze the expected proﬁts of the winning LF. Comparing expected proﬁts in

























∂ [ci(θ,p(θ)) − ci(θ,pa)]
∂θ
¶
(1 − F(θ))n−1dθ] g(θi)dθi.
The second line of (12) refers to the impact of the marginal competition eﬀect of the bargain-
ing power. This eﬀect already existed in the case where subcontracting was imposed, and
may either be positive or negative depending on speciﬁc assumptions about the bargaining
technology. The third line of (12) reﬂects the impact of the choice of the subcontracting
level. This impact may reinforce or reverse the previous eﬀect depending on the condition
p(θi) Q pa.
We then have the following lemma
Lemma 5 If the bargaining power of the LF does not depend on its own eﬃciency or if
am o r ei n e ﬃcient LF is a better bargainer (bargaining specialized), then the winning LF is
better oﬀ w i t ht h ea l l o t m e n tp r o c e d u r et h a nw i t ht h es u b c o n t r a c t i n gp r o c e d u r ei ft h eL Fi s
induced to subcontract a larger part of the contract relative to the allotted part.
Proof. See the Appendix.
If these conditions are not all satisﬁed, the results are less clear-cut: the winning LF may
be better oﬀ with subcontracting or with allotment depending on both the sensibility of the
optimal choice of p and the marginal competition eﬀect of the bargaining power. Indeed,















Consider now the case of the winning (or chosen in the case of subcontracting) SBF. The






















As depicted by the second line of (14), the diﬀerence between expected proﬁts depends on
both the global comparison of costs and the marginal competition eﬀect. Intuitively, the
winning SBF is better oﬀ with subcontracting if the gain from the bargaining on costs is
higher than the expected strategic mark-up in the auctioning of the allotted part.
6.2 Pareto dominating mechanism
The last section enables us to show that both the winning LF and the chosen SBF can
simultaneously prefer either the subcontracting procedure or the allotment procedure. In
contrast to proposition 1, since the LF can choose the subcontracting level, this result is not
necessarily at odds with an increase in expected total costs. Thus, we have the following
proposition
Proposition 2 When the LF is allowed to choose the subcontracting level, subcontracting
can be a Pareto dominating mechanism, i.e. simultaneously increasing both ﬁrms’ proﬁta n d
reducing the expected total cost.
We now give an intuitive explanation of this main result (a formal proof is given in
the appendix). The expected total cost for the public buyer is equal to the expected true
16costs (ETrC) plus the proﬁts conceded to the ﬁrms. Let us write the expected total costs
respectively for the subcontracting procedure





and the allotment procedure





Since the LF chooses the subcontracting level which minimizes ETrC, we necessarily have
ETrCs <E Tr C a.
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>0
,
that is if the increase in both ﬁrms’ proﬁts does not oﬀset the diﬀerence between expected
true costs.
Obviously, this result could not be obtained with imposed subcontracting since we would
always have ETrCa = ETrCs.
Further, the allotment procedure can never be a Pareto improving mechanism since it
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<0
,
which clearly cannot be true.
177C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has focused on the comparison of two aternative mechanisms enabling the partic-
ipation of SMEs in procurement. We highlight the impact of the choice of the subcontracting
level and of the bargaining process on the bidding strategy of LFs. Compared to traditional
developments in auction theory, these marginal competition eﬀects either increase or decrease
the familiar strategic mark-up. It enables us to derive some new insights into the design of
procurement rules.
We have derived conditions under which both the winning LF and the winning or chosen
SME can be better oﬀ with the allotment procedure or with the subcontracting procedure.
Speciﬁcaly, if the bargaining power of the LF does not depend on its own eﬃciency or if a
more ineﬃcient LF is a better bargainer, then the winning LF is better oﬀ with the allotment
procedure than with the subcontracting procedure if, compare to the allotted part, the LF is
induced to subcontract a larger part.
We have also explained why the public buyer and LFs can beneﬁtf r o mt h ea s y m m e t r i c
information between SMEs and LFs. Furthermore, when the winning LF is constrained on
the subcontracting level, we have shown that only a reduction of the chosen SME’s proﬁtc a n
reduce the expected cost of the contract. Nevertheless, when the LF is allowed to choose the
subcontracting level, subcontracting can be a Pareto dominating mechanism, i.e. simultane-
ously increasing both ﬁrms’ proﬁt and reducing the expected total cost of the contract.
An extension of this model could be to consider an allotted contract but to allow the
winning LF to subcontract a part of the residualp r o j e c t .I nt h i sc o n t e x t ,S M E sw o u l dh a v e
two ways to access public procurement.
188A p p e n d i x
Derivation of the optimal bidding strategy of LF i
Since we search for a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the bidding function, we have bi =























From this equation and (1), we obtain the optimal bidding strategy of LF i. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fl e m m a1 .From (8), we can consider the diﬀerence between the expected proﬁts





























∂θi =0since whatever the eﬃciency of
the winning LF is. So, this latter can always pay the subcontractor at a cost cj(b θ,p(θ)) =
cj(θ
(1)




i.e. if the LF is production specialized. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fl e m m a2 .From (7), the diﬀerence between the expected total costs under incom-























cj(b θ,p(θi)) − cj(θ
(1)
j ,p(θi)) > 0,
a condition for ETCs(ai) <E TC s(ci) to hold is
∂cj(  θ,p(θi))
∂θi < 0, which is in contradiction with


































∂θi is not too high. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 .Assuming
∂(cj(  θ,pa))
∂θ =0 , we get
ETCs − ETCa












= cj(b θ,pa) − cj(θ
(2)
j ,p a).
As with the comparison of the winning SBF’s proﬁt, the comparison of expected total costs
is based on the diﬀerence between negotiated and auctioned lots. Clearly, we obtain ETCs <
ETCa if the winning LF knows the SBFs’ costs. If these costs are private information, then
obviously ETCs >E TC a. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 .From (3) and (7), we have






































20Thus, subcontracting can be a Pareto dominating mechanism if the following conditions are
simultaneously satisﬁed 
    
    













ETCs <E T C a ⇔ (A4)
cj(b θ,pa) − cj(θ
(2)

















j ⇔ cj(b θ,pa) − cj(θ
(2)
j ,p a) > 0. (A5)








∂θ (1 − F(θ))n−1dθ
(1 − F(θi))n−1
























Since (A6) and (15) cannot both be satisﬁed, subcontracting cannot be a Pareto improving
mechanism. The same reasoning applies to the allotment procedure. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fl e m m a5

























∂ [ci(θ,p(θ)) − ci(θ,pa)]
∂θ
¶






is related to the sign of the cross derivative
∂2ci(θi,p)
∂p∂θi . More
precisely, since we assume that
∂2ci(θi,p)
∂p∂θi < 0, we have
∂ [ci(θi,p(θi)) − ci(θi,p a)]
∂θi
< (>)0if p(θi) > (<)pa.
If
∂cj(  θ,p(θ))





P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n2 .The diﬀerence in expected total costs of the contract, when the
LF is allowed to choose the subcontracting level, is


































Consider the special case of n = m and θi = θj,14 then h(θj)=g(θi) and (15) becomes





     

























     

g(θi)dθi.












ci(θ,p(θ)) + cj(b θ,p(θ)) − ci(θ,pa) − cj(θ,pa) < 0
. (A10)


















ci(θ,p(θ)) + cj(b θ,p(θ)) − ci(θ,pa) − cj(θ,pa) < 0
. (A11)
14Similar (but tedious) derivations can be made for more general situations. Our aim here is to provide
some suﬃcient conditions.
























i.e. if the gain from the bargaining on costs is higher than the expected strategic mark-up in
the auctioning of the allotted part. Then, suﬃcient conditions for a Pareto improvement are

    
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